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Panel Discussion*
Professor Mofsky: The first topic that I would like to raise
for your consideration is the question of independent directors.
Who are independent directors? How do we identify their independence? Why do we want to put them in control of a board, and
what evidence do we have with regard to independent directors?
I am going to make a couple of assertions to which you may
wish to respond. First, there is no organized empirical study that
has demonstrated that so-called "independent directors" are in
fact independent. Second, there is no body of empirical studies
conclusively establishing that independent boards produce greater
profits. I suggest that we are dealing with a phenomenon that is
based upon guess work and questionable psychological theories.
Now, having made those assertions, let us begin first with Professor Eisenberg.
Professor Eisenberg: I disagree with your conclusion, but
not with your preliminary statements. Your preliminary statements are accurate; the only problem is that we would have to
erase every statute from the books if we waited until we had conclusive empirical verification of the predicates of the statute. The
fact is that the social scientists are not in a position to make conclusive empirical judgments or empirical conclusions on any major
area of human activity that meets their own canons of reliability.
Human activity simply involves too many variables. What we are
talking about here is a sort of lifeguard function. There are a lot of
very profitable corporations that do not have independent directors. We are not asserting that this is the critical aspect of corporate life. If you gave me a choice between two worlds, and in one of
the worlds, boards were completely controlled by managers, but
managers were really good (that is, efficient), and in the other,
boards were completely objective-independent of managers-but
managers were really bad, of course I would pick the first. But we
do not have this either/or dichotomy. We can have a world in
which we trust that managers will be good, but we can also have
somebody sitting there watching their performance. There are
* The panelists were Professor Kenneth R. Andrews, Professor Victor Brudney,
Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mr.-Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Dean David S. Ruder, Mr.
Bryan F. Smith, and Professor Marc I. Steinberg. The moderator was Professor James S.
Mofsky.
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good managers and there are bad managers, and what we are saying is that we want somebody around to protect against the one
case in forty or one case in fifty where the managers are bad managers and ought to be removed. So your conclusion is a little like
saying that we have two beaches next to each other, one has a lifeguard and the other has no lifeguard, but no one has drowned at
either beach, so we should no longer have any lifeguards, because
there is no empirical evidence that lifeguards save lives. I think we
can use our judgment and our experience here-as we have to do
in so many areas of law-and say that in the marginal case, in the
incremental case, a board that is free of significant relationships
with managers is more likely to weed out the really bad manager
than is a board that is dominated by managers.
Profe8sor Mofsky: I would like to ask Ken Andrews to address the question of independent directors.
Profes8or Andrews: Certainly it is true that there is no empirical evidence one way or the other, and so this becomes a provocative question. We have to relate the independence to the purpose of this definition. You have a formal definition of
independence with which we are all familiar-not working for the
company, not being related. I think we could carry that all the way
forward to not knowing anything about the company or the industry or even being interested in the firm. That would be carrying
independence to its absurd extreme. The formal definition is not of
any particular interest, except for preserving the formal purity of
the separation between inside and outside. It happens, of course,
that independence becomes important, and it can occur in outside
directors or inside directors, particularly if you have a venerable
financial vice-president or executive vice-president or a relatively
young CEO [chief executive officer] and a board of outside directors that knows them both. Such an inside director is independent
because he does not feel insecure or suppressed and because he
recognizes the difference between his or her role as board member
and that of manager. Independence becomes important only in the
context of a very basic problem in corporate governance and board
management.
Our concern is the phenomenon of CEO dominance of the
board. The chairman can dominate a board composed of so-called
"formally independent directors" just as easily as he can dominate
a board composed of insiders who report to him or are dependent
upon him for their livelihood. So the real issue becomes the extent
to which either inside directors or especially outside direc-
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tors-because it is easier for them to disagree-can actually feel
free to disagree.
Academicians are the second most frequent source of board
members; chief executive officers of other companies are the preferred source. The one thing you can say about academic directors
is that they do not tell you how they do things in their companies.
There are outside directors who specialize in bringing their own
experience into a board and disrupting its operation by not recognizing changes in circumstances. We do not mean that kind of independence. The ability to permit directors to be usefully independent is a function of the skill of the chairman, and we are very
short of that skill.
Professor Brudney: I suppose the answer to your questions
really is another question-In what context do you seek answers?
You have used the concept of independence as though it means
something. You have said that we have no statistics; maybe we
ought to look at history to see how the concept of independent
director originated.
The independent director originated not as a policeman of
managerial efficiency or an assurer that management will perform
well for the company. Instead, he originated in the context of conflict of interest. That is where independence first showed up, and
the definition means something different in that context than it
means in the next context in which it showed up historically. In
the sixties and seventies, the independent director was urged as
the representative of unrepresented "externalities"environmentalists, ethnic groups, and the like. The meaning of
that "independence" is quite different from the definition of independence for purposes of conflict of interest. Then along comes the
Draft Restatement'-and I think it is really an accident as to the
part of the body of corporate law it happened to describe
first-and it uses the term independent director not to cover representing outside constituencies in order to bring different social or
economic points of view into the boardroom or resolving conflicts
of interest among managers or among other directors inside the
board, but to refer to the monitoring of the board for "efficiency"
on behalf of the stockholders. Of all the roles, that role is the most
difficult. I doubt that we have operating criteria by which to measure when management is performing minimally. I do not know
1. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA-

TIONS

(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as

RESTATEMENT].
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what "independence" means in the context of "efficiency." For instance, with regard to the CEO's of other organizations, will their
empathy with the CEO on whose board they serve prevent them
from being critical? With regard to academics, I do not know to
what extent their institutional interests impede their service as diligent policemen.
In any event, the thrust of much of the talk here has been that
what is needed are directors who will help firms to do better, not
directors who will prevent them from doing worse. And if that is
the objective, then we do not need much law. The reason for the
law impinging on this area of corporate behavior or structure is to
reduce the downside risks. We all recognize that the law cannot
make companies perform better. The question is how should the
law protect stockholders from managements that are doing poorly
in matters of efficiency. And to that question the history of dutyof-care case law teaches that we have precious few answers. It is
hard, if not impossible, to find cases in which directors have been
held liable for lack of care in a nonfinancial company, except when
management has been engaged in a conflict of interest that the directors have failed to police. I do not know whether there is a solution, nor do I know whether your statistics are going to prove
anything.
Professor Mofsky: Just as a technical matter, Professor Eisenberg, you may want to point out that there may be a different
definition of the term "independence" in connection with terminating derivative actions.
Professor Eisenberg: I do want to make that point. There
was a statement made that directors who are not free of significant
relationships with the senior executives, for purposes of board
composition, also would not be considered disinterested for purposes of terminating derivative actions. That is not the case. For
purposes of sitting on a committee that would investigate whether
a derivative action should be terminated, the test is disinterestedness. And a director who has a significant relationship for purposes
of part III of the ALI [American Law Institute] Draft might nevertheless be disinterested for purposes of parts IV, V, and VII.
Professor Mofsky: Mr. Katzenbach, would you care to address the independence of directors?
Mr. Katzenbach: Very briefly, just to discuss it from another
slightly different viewpoint. People have talked about independent
directors as meaning essentially nothing more than those who are
not employed by the company and who are not related to the man-
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agement of the company. Yet, those who are not independent in
this sense can make a lot of contributions to how that company is
run, particularly if they are chief executive officers of other companies and have had experience of this kind. Many times companies,
even in obviously very different areas of business, have had the
same experience. On the other hand, with respect to independent
directors, if you attempt to select strong people because you think
it is advantageous to the company, then you at least avoid some of
the tunnel vision that you can get from people who are. so engaged
in the management of the company that they do not see some of
the larger issues. I think there is a contribution that independent
directors can make. That is not necessarily saying that they can
improve, by some insight that they have, the bottom line on the
profitability of that company. But they do have an enormously important function.
The reason I think that it is really advantageous to have a
majority of independent directors is that, if a company is not doing
well financially, the directors ought to be able to remove that management and try again with new people. And I think that the primary function of the board's independence is an ability simply to
fire the manager. The board may pay him off very generously, but
they do get rid of him. And directors exercise that power if they
have been well-selected. Remember, when a company is not doing
well financially, the internal management of the company loses
some of the loyalty of the board, except in very rare situations.
Therefore, they are likely to be informed about gross mismanagement. And I think that is the most useful function that independent directors perform; that probably could be said about university trustees, too.
Professor Eisenberg: I am in full accord; that is the major
underlying theory of part III of the ALI Draft.
Professor Mofsky: I know Dave Ruder has thoughts on this
subject.
Dean Ruder: I have some notes to add to the last topic.
There is a difference between an independent board that provides
a monitoring function in conflict of interest transactions and an
independent board that functions with regard to management responsibility. It seems to me that if you draft standards for independence, you should ask whether there are some distinctions that
should be drawn between these two functions. The purpose of having so-called "outside directors" should be to give them the responsibility of monitoring conflict of interest transactions. Also, as
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Mr. Katzenbach suggested, outside directors should throw management out if management consistently is doing a bad job. Whether
the standards for independence should be the same may require
some additional thought.
In any event, there is not much to be gained by defining the
outside director with the degree of strictness that the present
Draft Restatement uses.' As I view that draft, its specificity results
in almost as restrictive a definition as the Metzenbaum s and Rosenthal4 bills contained. I prefer the New York Stock Exchange
definition.5 You might take the position that you should not count
someone as being an independent director if that person is employed by the corporation or has a current material investment,
banking, or legal relationship with the corporation. The present
draft goes further than that, and it seems to me to be too strict.
Professor Eisenberg: The definition in the ALI Draft is very
close to what you just suggested. If you look at it carefully, the
only people we pick up that you have not picked up are those who
are in effect doing five percent of their business or $200,000 worth,
whichever is more, in the case of managers of vendors or suppliers,
or $200,000 worth of business, in the case of an owner of a vendor
or supplier. Five percent of your business is a very high test. As to
managers, the $200,000 is not going to be the operational test, because in most cases that will not be five percent. So really, there
are very few vendors or suppliers that those tests would reach, and
the other categories are the tests you just mentioned.
Dean Ruder: No, you use "affiliated with" language: "affiliated in a professional capacity with corporate counsel.

. .

, or with

an investment-banking firm that has been retained by the corporation, or acted as a managing underwriter in an issue of the corporation's securities, within the two preceding years .... "
Professor Eisenberg: I thought you said that you would
agree thatDean Ruder: I said, I do not know where I am on it. I could
2. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1.24.
3. Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REC. S3754 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1980).
4. Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980: Hearings on S.2567 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 360 (1980).
5. See NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.00 (1983) (audit
committee membership).
6. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1,

§ 1.24(5)

(citation omitted).
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argue about it, but you may want to say that you do not want a
lawyer to be the chief lawyer for the corporation and also to be on
the board. There is a lot of room for argument there. But when you
say, "I do not want anybody who is in this firm or was ever in this
firm or was in this firm in the last two years," you go a lot farther.
It seems to me that one has to be very careful in the definition of
outside director.
More interesting to me is the question whether you can trust
people. Perhaps I am more trusting than others, but when you get
into the trust question, you are evaluating notions of goodness. I
believe it is possible to trust independent directors. I know that
the Investment Company Act works upon the belief that it is possible to use independent directors in dealing with potential conflict
situations.7
Professor Mofsky: There have been some suggestions about
eliminating directors entirely. Mr. Smith, would you like to address that question?
Mr. Smith: I would like to add a few quick comments. First, I
do not know whether this would fit within the definition of empirical evidence, but some years ago a study was made by Professor
Vance.8 His study concluded that those companies whose boards
were composed of inside directors were more successful than those
whose boards were composed of a majority of outside directors.
The study is out of date, but I offer it to address the question regarding studies of that kind.
More importantly, I feel that independence is simply a state of
mind. Some people have the ability to be independent, others do
not. Definitions and standards of independence do not help much
when independent directors are confronted with the dynamics of a
very difficult boardroom situation.
The other point I would like to emphasize is how important it
is for work to be done to enhance the qualities of leadership at the
board level, not merely in technique but in the effective functioning of the board.
Professor Steinberg: I think the real reason for requiring independent directors is to obtain directors who have the ability to
exercise impartial judgment on behalf of the corporation. One potential problem with this approach is that you want not only im7. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1982) (requiring, for approval of investment adviser's contract,
vote or majority of directors who are not parties to the contract or interested persons of
such party).
8. S. VANCE, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR: A CRITICAL EVALUATION (1968).
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partial judgment, but competent judgment. If directors without
skill or experience are put on the board, then, as Professor Andrews implied, those directors are going to be very much dependent upon the insiders.
Traditionally, the definition of an independent director has
excluded corporate insiders, such as officers, relatives of officers,
and controlling persons of the corporation. I agree with Dean
Ruder that the Draft Restatement goes significantly further by excluding such persons as major suppliers, investment bankers, and
counsel to the corporation. The whole effort here, however, is to
draw an appropriate line regarding which persons can exercise impartial judgment. I am not sure that the Draft Restatement draws
the correct line, either. An argument can be set forth-and I am by
no means endorsing it-that chief executive officers of other corporations, even if those corporations are engaged in totally different
industries, are not independent. For example, such officers may
well have been involved during their managerial careers in derivative suits, perhaps as defendants themselves. They are thus more
likely to side with management of the corporation on whose board
they serve for purposes of assessing the merits of the present litigation. As another example, what about golfing cronies? Although
these individuals do not come within the significant-relationship
standard of section 1.24, it would seem that close friends would
agree on many issues. A further example is the case of college
professors. The salaries of many college professors are in dire need
of increase, and many corporations will pay substantial remuneration to a professor who serves as a director. These illustrations
therefore go back to the basic question of where to draw the line.
An interesting statement was made by Judge Cudahy dissenting in Panterv. Marshall Field & Co." There, Carter-Hawley made
a tender offer for Marshall Field, which Carter-Hawley subsequently withdrew prior to the offer becoming effective. At the
time, Marshall Field stock was selling for approximately twenty
dollars per share, while Carter-Hawley's offer was for approximately forty dollars per share. The directors of Marshall Field took
the position that the tender offer was against the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders. The board thereupon engaged in a number of defensive tactics, which included the undertaking of defensive acquisitions, the filing of an antitrust suit
against Carter-Hawley, and the issuing of a number of statements
9. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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to Marshall Field shareholders. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
that the directors' actions were protected by the business judgment
rule. Apparently a major reason for the appellate court's holding
was the fact that a majority of Marshall Field's board consisted of
"independent outside directors."
Dissenting, Judge Cudahy said the following:
Directors of a New York Stock Exchange-listed company
are, at the very least, "interested" in their own positions of
power, prestige and prominence (and in their not inconsequential perquisites). They are "interested" in defending against
outside attack the management which they have, in fact, installed or maintained in power-"their" management (to which,
in many cases, they owe their directorships). And they are "interested" in maintaining the public reputation of their own leadership and stewardship against the claims of "raiders" who say
that they can do better.' 0
In other words, I am suggesting that there is no easy answer. We
are trying to balance the corporation's basic objective of profit
maximization on the one hand with corporate accountability and
governance on the other. The key criterion, therefore, is whether
the director can exercise impartial and competent judgment. There
is no clear answer to that question.
Professor Mofsky: It was asserted this morning that the
concept of the board of directors was an evolving one. Someone
also stated that it would be a mistake to restate the requirements
with respect to the board of directors because to do so would decrease the flexibility needed to generate a board of directors that
maximized the efficient operations of the firm. In that regard, Professor Eisenberg, I am sure you have a criticism.
Professor Eisenberg: Allow me to give some background

here. One of the problems in discussing the ALI Draft at all is that
it is in a process of evolution. The Draft has not been put to a vote
by the general membership of the American Law Institute; it is
being changed in response to comments we are receiving from the
membership, advisors, consultants, and American Bar Association
committees. So it is a little difficult either to criticize it or to defend it. I say that, because some of the criticisms we heard this
morning regarding, for example, flexibility, were more relevant to
10. Id. at 300-01 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
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earlier drafts than to the present draft. Now if you study evolution,
you find that there is a genetic code shared by every organism at
every stage of evolution. That is to say, there are some base elements upon which the process of evolution builds. Similarly, the
ALI Draft addresses only some base elements.
The ALI Draft says that the board should oversee the business
of the corporation. This is not new. It would shock a lot of people
if you told them that the board would not be derelict in its duties
if it did not oversee the management of the corporation. To say
that the board may sit back and have no responsibility to oversee
management-that would be new, that would be radical. The
Draft's approach is therefore very simple. We are saying to the
board: "You must oversee the management, you must select or
elect at least the principal senior executives, and you must make
decisions on major corporate transactions-period. Whatever else
you do is up to you." So the reports of our inflexibility and of the
extent to which we interfere with evolution are greatly
exaggerated.
Let me say a couple of other things about evolution. I very
much agree with a statement that Ken Andrews made, that no major decision can await perfect information. The people who are saying-and I am talking about the community at large-"Let evolution go forward," are not suggesting rules that are going to govern
the functioning of a board of directors now. The corporation is a
major social institution. It may be the dominant social institution
in this country. Accordingly, there must be some minimum rules of
accountability. We hear complaints-with which I happen to
agree-that it should not be said that the fear of a derivative action keeps corporations honest and is the driving engine of corporate avoidance of conflict of interest. But if you do not want the
litigation model-which I do not want-then you have to have a
substitute for litigation. What the Reporters are suggesting is to let
the corporation regulate itself. But if it is going to regulate itself,
there must be some mechanisms within the corporation that will
perform that function. It was also said that the Reporters are talking about a structure in which the board is antagonistic toward the
officers. This is not correct. After all, we are talking about a common modality. That is, at least sixty percent of large publicly held
corporations already have this structure. One can have a collaborative structure in which there is nevertheless some room for criticism. For example, in the decentralized corporation the headquarters office works cooperatively with, and at the same time judges
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the performance of, divisional management. We have in mind a
model very much like the model of the decentralized corporation. I
do not think a corporation can function well with ongoing antagonism or an adversarial relationship between the board and its officers. Compare this situation to the relationship between a dean
and a faculty member. A dean has to support his faculty members.
Nevertheless, he has to be able to make judgments about faculty
members. So the idea of supportiveness on the one hand, and evaluative judgments on the other, is not an idea that is internally inconsistent in the context of the board and officers of the
corporation.
So, I really do not agree with this inflexibility argument. Also,
I just do not see how we are cutting off the evolution of the board
by requiring the board to perform an oversight function.
By the way, the present statutes say the board shall manage
the business of the corporation. It is not as if the ALI Draft suddenly is introducing a mandated structure when none existed
before. We are giving content to what the legislatures always assumed when they adopted the idea of the mandated board.
Dean Ruder: Did you deliberately eliminate the language
"the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of the
board of directors"? One could read that change as reducing the
power of the board.
Professor Eisenberg: The answer to the first question is yes.
The answer to what that change means is that at one point we did
intend to reduce the power of the board of the large publicly held
corporation in that respect, but we ultimately discarded that idea.
The traditional statute says that the board shall manage the business of the corporation. Actually, the board does not manage in the
ordinary sense of the word. We thought it was not a good idea for
the law to be out of step with reality. Therefore, at one point we
did say that in the large publicly held corporation the board could
not manage. But we have dropped that, and now we propose to
give the board power to manage.
Dean Ruder: In another draft?
Professor Eisenberg: Yes.
Professor Mofsky: In light of those changes, Professor Andrews, do you want to address the question of evolution?
Professor Andrews: Yes, because I am reassured by what I
have heard. I have stopped stressing the lack of flexibility argument, because the Reporters have wisely retreated from what
many interpret to be a degree of arbitrariness. The problem
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is-and this may be a problem of communication between the Reporters and the management community-that if evolution is improving boards, it is because directors and chairmen of boards are
realizing increasingly that in individual situations the board can
make a more effective contribution to the function of the corporation. It is very difficult to prescribe that involvement by the board
from a position outside of the corporation. So I think fear rather
than reality causes a lot of the talk about the lack of flexibility in
prescribing standards for directors.
When we know what the theory ought to be of the board of a
large publicly held corporation, then we can record it. In the
meantime, people in the management community are having a
problem with the Restatement's use of a single, monitoring
model-and nothing that I said this morning should be interpreted
as meaning the board should not monitor management. But the
idea that monitoring should be the single, dominant public mission
of the board poses a problem. The monitoring board will arrive at
a meeting in the posture of-if we use Victor Brudney's
phrase-"diligent policemen." A chief executive officer, particularly if he is somewhat insecure about his position, is not likely to
enjoy a board meeting where the outside directors come dressed as
Gilbert and Sullivan characters from the Pirates of Penzance. So
there is a sensitivity to monitoring and to criticism, which a skillful
board will suppress. A skillful board will not keep a chief executive
officer constantly under fire; it will monitor a CEO with-as Mel
Eisenberg described-a combination of support and evaluation.
That combination of support and evaluation can result in a board's
confidence that management is not only not derelict, but it also
has a positive program for enhancing the company's future.
I have not seen the revised drafts, nor did I see the sternness
of monitoring as moderated by the role of outside directors supporting a chief executive until the time when the board's support is
no longer possible. If the Reporters are now stressing that they do
not mean to freeze a model of a monitoring board, then the criticism of interference with the board's evolution will disappear. The
boards are getting better for reasons that are related to the progress of the management process generally. This progress may be
statistically difficult to prove, but it is a belief that sustains the
interest in management of many of the people who take part in the
management of the corporation.
Professor Brudney: I hate to see conflict evaporate like this.
[Laughter]
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Professor Mofsky: I did not intend to create harmony here.
Professor Brudney: First of all, as to the diligent policeman's role, it is a matter of context. The monitoring board members arrive, and, properly, they should constitute a warning to
management with respect to conflicts of interest situations. There
ought to be policemen there. When we move to problems of managerial efficiency, however, we are indeed in the quagmire that the
seven of us find ourselves in-agreeing and not agreeing. The fundamental assertion that Mr. Smith and Professor Andrews make is
that the affirmative, productive value of the board-even if it is
inconsistent with a monitoring role-ought to be the dominant
value. But Professor Andrews just conceded that he does not mean
the board should refrain from any monitoring. I would like to ask
each of you-particularly since each of you gave illustrations of
how the American Law Institute's proposals could interfere with
efficient management, could create obstacles to an imaginative
board-is it the case that a majority of outsiders would be likely to
prevent experimentation? Or would an audit committee composed
of a majority of outsiders be likely to prevent experimentation and
a productive relationship?
Where is the rigidity in the Draft Restatement model of the
board? Rigidity is a word that could be used to describe the prescription of fire escapes after the "Triangle" fire. Any flat prohibition that is part of a minimal safety net can be characterized as
"rigid." The issue here is what is rigid about the proposed requirements? Why cannot corporations live easily with these requirements? Unless you can answer that, I do not think we have an
issue.
Mr. Smith: In the spirit of what Professor Eisenberg has described this afternoon, we have seen and heard a tone that-I am
sorry to say-is not reflected in the written form of the project or
in some of the dialogue. For example, as to statements like "we did
intend to reduce the power of the board," I question whether it is
within the power of the Reporters to undertake such a massive
task and to succeed in institutionalizing it. Many feel that wellestablished legal principles of corporate governance have evolved
into workable patterns, and if those patterns are reduced to a more
rigid form, substantial time and effort will be spent conforming to
the new pattern. But the recent evolution of corporate boards and
the establishment of audit committees or compensation committees demonstrates that the existing structure is working. The corporate view is that we do not need to have this system of audit
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committees or compensation committees institutionalized, particularly if it is in the form of statutory prescriptions.
I also have heard this afternoon what Ken Andrews has described, that is, a tone somewhat different from the impression
that the public drafts associated with the project have made. To
draw an analogy, rejection of the new patterns of the board's function resembles the attitudes held toward the Financial Accounting
Standards Board [FASB]. It is similar to the very single-minded
attitude of the FASB, which has tended to disregard input from its
constituencies.
The biggest concerns are (a) that we do not think that we need
a restatement, and (b) that, if it is put into the rigid forms that
have been suggested, it will at least slow down the evolutionary
process.
Mr. Katzenbach: I thought that your shifting of the burden
of proof, Professor Brudney, was a little unfair. Are you suggesting
that it is not possible to monitor a corporation with a board that
has less than a majority of outside directors?
Professor Brudney: I would guess that the probability is
that you are less likely to be monitoring rather than more likely. It
is not a binary choice.
Mr. Katzenbach:Thirteen-to-twelve would not be able to do
it?
Professor Brudney: Well, if you want to play that law professor's gameMr. Katzenbach: You were playing it to some extent-I said
that I agree that a majority should be outside directors, but I do
not agree that you cannot have an ethos in your board, as you do
in your management style, that will give you in a board just as
much monitoring without the necessity for a majority of outside
directors, however you define outside directors.
Professor Brudney: In the real world, we must act not on
isolated possibilities but on probability judgments. It is true that I
cannot assert that in any given case twelve directors will monitor
less independently than thirteen. It is just more probable that you
are going to get independence with a majority of independent directors than with a minority. You do not deny that either.
Mr. Katzenbach: It seems to me that the power of those
outside directors could be a lot greater if they were in a minority
than if they were in a majority.
But the question had to do with rigidity. I merely suggest to
you that this particular problem of monitoring is sometimes per-
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ceived as rigid because people say it must be done in a certain
way-even though I approve of the notion of monitoring. I cannot
imagine today an audit committee that is not composed of outside
directors. One of you can tell me whether twenty-five years ago
that would have been the case. I do not know. But if not, that is
the evolution that was being talked about, and I just wanted to
restore a little debate in this group.
Professor Brudney: Requiring a majority by law at a time
when a majority is by far the prevailing arrangement does not interfere with evolution of the board.
Professor Andrews: Let me illustrate with the nature of the
SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] regulation of industry.
Many people believe that it is more acceptable for the SEC to proposition the New York Stock Exchange to install a rule for Exchange members-a practice far exceeding the SEC's original charter-than it is for the SEC to specify a wider-ranging, rigid series
of rules.
The Watergate business made the outside audit committee an
absolute necessity, because in that kind of situation the appearances of conflict of interest become as bad as the reality of conflict
of interest. So the board, in terms of evolution, responded to the
Stock Exchange's requirement by saying, "Okay, why not." Some
companies went through hell; Johnson and Johnson did not have
any outside directors on its board. It went around trying to recruit
enough directors for an audit committee, in order not to be
delisted.
Audit committees not only had to appear independent, but
they actually became independent when they dug into the affairs
of corporations. Directors had access for the first time to a variety
of information-where do you think these voluntary admissions of
improper payments came from? It was not just a sudden fear of
the SEC finding out; it would have taken the SEC a hundred years
to find out those things. But when the outside directors found out
about improper payments, the directors wanted them reported.
And they were reported. And the accountants were emboldened for
the first time to report what they knew and, even more, to find out
what they should have known. Also, internal audit committees,
which can find out more in a week than outside independent audits can find out in a year, began to become effective. These committees began to produce information that was then reported by
boards, notwithstanding the CEO's objections. Pretty soon, the
CEO was not going to those meetings, at the suggestion of the
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outside directors. Shortly after that, all the management representatives-secretary of the board, the financial vice-president,
whoever else was there-were also invited to leave the meeting
during the last fifteen minutes, so that the auditors and audit committee could talk and so that there could be at least a formal
"speak now or forever hold your peace," or "is there anything that
you know that we ought to know that the ordinary processes of
interference with communication in large organizations are
preventing us from finding out?" Now, that is an evolution.
The second stage of board evolution is represented by the
compensation committee, which is, for the first time in a long
while, showing conscientious and effective concern about the problem of executive compensation. This is something different.
Outside directors serving on compensation committees are one of
the many forces that have propelled executive compensation upward. That is a severe problem now being faced and discussed by
the executive compensation committees. It is a thorny one; I have
no idea what the solution is.
The nominating committee represents another stage. Although
the chief executive officer must be on that committee, and the
committee cannot come up with nominees that would be repugnant to him or her, for the first time the committee is not composed of the cronies or the old friends-the "safe people." Neither
the chief executive officer nor most members of the board know
the people who are being elected to boards. This is being done as a
recruiting process. Given the internal dynamics of boards, these
are major advances. That is what we mean by evolution; it can be
supported by external regulation; it is not necessarily interfered
with by external regulation.
Dean Ruder: The point, if I can just follow that up, is this: If
you say to an organization that is in evolution, "Every time you
bring yourself forward a little bit more, we are then going to enact
that movement into law," then you are going to constrain any forward movement. The organization may not want to take a step if it
thinks that every time it does so, another group will come along
and say, "Hey, we like that one; that is the evolution we like; now
that is law; now let us see you do something more."
Professor Steinberg: I would like to make a comment. In
my understanding, although former SEC Chairman Williams did
put pressure on the New York Stock Exchange to require independent audit committees for listed domestic companies, the fact of
the matter is that the Exchange voluntarily adopted this rule.
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Some commentators have argued that the SEC virtually thrust this
audit committee rule upon the New York Stock Exchange. Even
presuming that is true-and I am not presuming that it is-there
is authority for the SEC's exercise of such authority. Indeed, at
about the time that Chairman Williams "encouraged" the adoption
of such a rule, the SEC General Counsel came out with a legal
opinion-which I believe was issued entirely in good faith-that
the SEC did have the authority to require publicly held companies
to maintain independent audit committees. 1
Also, I want to point out that during Harold Williams' chairmanship, he made several innovative proposals with which a number of corporate managers disagreed. For example, Chairman Williams suggested that all directors of a corporation should be
outside directors, except for the chief executive officer who would
not serve as chairman of the board. He also stated that audit committees should be comprised solely of disinterested directors and
that neither the inside nor the outside general counsel to the corporation should serve as a director. Irrespective of whether one
agrees with these proposals, it should be noted that Chairman Williams believed in the voluntary adoption of these changes. Indeed,
during hearings on the Metzenbaum bill, 12 which would have imposed federal minimum standards relating to corporate accountability and governance mechanisms, Chairman Williams testified
against such governmental intervention. He stated that legislation
that sought to regulate the corporate boardroom would basically
retard the purposes that it intended to achieve."
With respect to the monitoring model, it is my belief that to
ensure accountability within the corporate structure, directors
should monitor or oversee managerial conduct. I must say, however, based largely on Professor Andrews' insightful article in the
Harvard Business Review, 4 that the board should be allowed to
engage in managerial activities, if it so desires. Indeed, in his article, Professor Andrews points out four kinds of corporate boards,
in addition to the board that adopts exclusively a monitoring
model.
11. Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Rule, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 82,120 (June 28, 1979).
12. The Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, supra note 3.
13. Professor Steinberg deals with these issues at length in his recent book, CORPORATE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE (1983).
14. Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, HAv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec.
1982, at 34.
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Another interesting article, written by Professor Dent in the
Boston University Law Review,'" debatably argues that the monitoring model is really a minority model. Basically, Professor Dent
contends that "expositions of the monitoring model to date have
been rudimentary. Its proponents have not suggested what forces
will prompt corporations to adopt the model and thereby move it
from theory to widely accepted reality."' At a later point, Professor Dent asserts: "Acceptance of monitoring by commentators and
corporations has led the CorporateDirector's Guidebook and some
other authorities to speak of a duty of monitoring as if it were established fact rather than a remote ideal."' 7
Professor Eisenberg: I am glad that you pointed out that
the Corporate Director's Guidebook,' 8 which was prepared and issued under the auspices of the ABA, talks about monitoring. So
does the Business Roundtable's Statement on Corporate Governance, in effect (although it does not use that term as such). 19 I find
it ironic for Professor Dent to say that this is a new concept, or not
established, when it is in the Corporate Director's Guidebook.
That is a little bit like what someone once said about Plato: that
he was out of the mainstream of Greek thought. [Laughter] When
the CorporateDirector's Guidebook says that there is a monitoring
function, even if there was not one before it said so, there is one
then. But believe me, despite what Professor Dent says, there was
a monitoring function before the Corporate Director's Guidebook
came out with it.
Dean Ruder: I was on the committee that drafted the Corporate Director's Guidebook, and I agree with you that the monitoring model was part of the Corporate Director's Guidebook. The
only offense I take is that, after substantial consideration of
whether to make the monitoring model voluntary, we chose the
voluntary model. You have taken the opposite view.
Professor Eisenberg: Yes, but nevertheless we built on your
experience.
Professor Mofsky: Until we moved on to this subject, several of you were focusing on the questions of whether new statu15. Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the
Director'sDuty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REv. 623 (1981).
16. Id. at 624.
17. Id. at 633 (footnote omitted).
18. Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, CorporateDirector's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1978).
19. The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of
the Large Publicly Owned Corporation,33 Bus. LAW. 2083 (1978).
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tory law is at all desirable in this area and how the Model Business
Corporation Act fits into this proposed restatement. In that regard,
there were some significant assertions this morning that new law is
neither desirable nor needed. I will ask Mel Eisenberg to respond
to that and then see if anybody else wishes to address it.
Professor Eisenberg: To some extent this is a false issue.
The problem is that corporation law is a unique jurisprudential
animal. Although most bodies of law are either largely case or common law, or else are largely of statutory origin, corporation law is a
hybrid. Many of the most important rules of corporation law, such
as duty of care and duty of loyalty, are largely common law rules,
although there is some statutory overlay. But many other areas,
such as distributions, mergers, and so forth, involve basically statutory areas. You simply cannot get away from statutory rules if you
are going to deal with the high points of corporation law.
This morning, Dave Ruder mentioned the Model Act. I think
that as of ten years ago it was not a very good act. But the Act has
been substantially improved in a number of areas, although it still
has some significant defects. The states, however, have not yet
adopted most of its newer provisions. Furthermore, Delaware probably will not adopt many of them. Although it has in some respects
come together with the Model Act, Delaware is very fierce about
preserving its independence from the Model Act.
Some of the major issues that the ALI Draft covers have to be
governed by statute. The Model Act touches on them, and we
touch on them. Certainly, the Model Act cannot, and ought not,
preclude the ALI from thinking about the same issues. The ALI
Draft comes from a somewhat different frame of reference; it is a
somewhat different process.
There is, however, a real issue here. In part III, we are treading new ground in proposing some statutory rules. It is not new
ground to say that composition and structure should be determined by statute, because the basic rule now is that the board of
directors shall manage the business of the corporation. That is a
structural rule that all states require. Furthermore, there is some
law regarding composition of the board, although it is restricted
mostly to investment companies. But certainly, to require composition and to require an audit committee, and so forth, would be
new. The issue is not so much statute versus nonstatute, but
mandatory versus nonmandatory. If you want to make a procedure
mandatory, the only way to do so is by statute.
As to other issues, such as the provisions governing security
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for expenses, what shareholders get to vote on, and so forth, you
can only mandate those procedures by statute.
Dean Ruder: I agree that some of the things you have suggested can be accomplished only by statute. Your derivative suit
section is suitable for a statutory provision, and it requires treatment as though it were a statutory provision.
There are two sections that may not restate prior law. I would
be interested in your reaction to them. We have not talked about
one of them, section 2.01. That section states: "Corporate law
should provide that the objective of the business corporation is to
conduct business activities with a view to corporate profit and
shareholder gain"-with which I agree-"except that, even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business

. .

.(c) may devote re-

sources, within reasonable limits, to public welfare, humanitarian,
educational, and philanthropic purposes. ' ' 20 I read that provision

as creating new law. The notes to that section state: "There is very
little direct authority on the permissibility of taking ethical principles into account in framing corporate action where doing so might
not enhance profits.

21

I think even you, as the drafters, should

agree that this section changesthe law by saying that, even if the
corporation is not going to make a profit, it may take its resources
away from the shareholders and use those resources for public welfare. I regard that as quite a new wrinkle. It is very interesting that
the business community does not seem to be bothered by this. The
business community seems to take the position that this is good
because now nobody can sue corporate officers and directors for
making charitable contributions. I guess I come out as being both
left and right in this situation.
Professor Eisenberg: Certainly there is room for differences
as to how to interpret the cases. In a lot of situations, devoting
resources to public-welfare purposes is consistent with an economic
motive; the corporation may believe that its long-run profitability
will be enhanced by that kind of action. But what about devoting
resources to public-welfare purposes when there is no assurance of
long-run profitability? I read the cases as supporting the view that
devoting resources to public-welfare purposes can be done within
reasonable limits even in this type of case. Section 2.01 does put an
objective limit on that. Because there is large potential for draining
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2.01.

21. Id. § 2.01 reporter's note 5, at 42.
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the corporation's assets, and, by hypothesis, you do not have a necessary nexus between the activity and the profit objective, there
must be a reasonable limit. The principal test for whether such a
use is reasonable is "the customary level at which resources are
devoted to such purposes among comparable corporations, in proportion to earnings and assets, and the strength of the nexus between the use of corporate resources and the corporation's business."2 2 In addition, I would say that apart from the cases, this
section reflects widespread corporate practice. The practice does
not make it right, but we would be making extreme changes if public-welfare-motivated activities were not permitted. There really is
a lot of money being given to public-welfare activities by corporations that could plausibly be considered as furthering corporate profits, but that is truly motivated by public-welfare
considerations.
Finally, there is the Model Act, which in section 4(m) states,
"Each corporation [that is incorporated under this act] shall have
power. . .[t]o make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes."28 This section, which is
widely adopted, does not say anything else, and that is essentially
what section 2.01(c) of the ALI Draft says. So I think that widespread statutory precedent, existing case authority, and corporate
practice supports the position.
Dean Ruder: I think it is wrong.
Professor Eisenberg: That is another question, and you can
make a strong argument that way.
Dean Ruder: I share the comment that is in your text that
says, "There is very little direct authority on the permissibility of
taking ethical principles into account .. .-.
Mr. Katzenbach: The Reporters have an extraordinarily difficult job, in part, because of the restatement format itself. In trying to cover all of the subject matter that they think should be
covered, the Reporters run the gamut between restating what they
think the better rule is under the law of fifty states and engaging
in judicial legislation. That is a very difficult task to undertake.
Some of the controversy that the Draft Restatement has encountered is the result of the project's format as an American Law Institute restatement, which makes it about ten times tougher than
22. Id. § 2.01 comment h, at 33.
23. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 4(m) (1979).
24. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2.01 reporter's note 5, at 42.
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drafting a piece of legislation, irrespective of the existing law.
Professor Brudney: To elaborate on what Mr. Katzenbach
was saying, I would like to ask whether there is a case that falls
within the ALI rule, but that would not be successfully defended
by eminent counsel as conduct that in the long run benefits the
corporation. Are we not just talking about a null case, and maybe
the ALI Reporters are trying to be more explicit than they have to
be.
Dean Ruder: The answer, in my view, is that almost anything that a corporation wants to do can be done, justifiably,
within the long-range profit-maximization theory. But if that is the
case, there is no reason for saying that a corporation may do
whatever it wishes without regard to profit maximization as long as
it stays "within reasonable limits." I do not go from A to B in your
logic; I go in a different direction, maybe left and right at the same
time.
Professor Mofsky: It is time to take some questions from
the floor.
Audience Member: Professor Eisenberg started the discussion today by giving us a rather interesting political overview of
the development of corporate law. I was wondering whether that
same political overview, as brought to bear on the ALI project,
might not lead to an unfortunate outcome. We have seen the discussion divide the project into two areas: conflict of interest and
structural change. In the conflict of interest area, we are apt to get
a political compromise at the ALI level that codifies or restates the
law and freezes it in an unsatisfactory status and chooses from a
range of precedents that are nonneutral and that unduly favor the
managers of the corporation. In the structural area, all the ALI
project attempts to do, and can attempt to do, is to ensure the
form, but not the substance, of corporate governance. Yet the discussion today makes it evident that it is the substance that is critical in many respects-what people do on audit committees, what
people do on compensation committees. Professor Andrews made
reference to the way we have compensation committees composed
of outside directors who carefully scrutinize executive compensation. But we also read about compensation committees composed
of outside directors that grant multimillion dollar golden
parachutes and are insulated by the structure of law that is being
created. It seems to me that there is a fairly powerful case for concluding that the ALI project is going to lead to an unsatisfactory
formulation of the law and, for that reason, is not a constructive
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effort.
Professor Eisenberg: That is an excellent point/question. I
think there is that danger, although I am hopeful it will not come
to pass.
This afternoon, Bryan Smith and Ken Andrews said that they
perceived a difference in the tone of the ALI Draft from what they
had seen before. Unquestionably, there have been some changes
that I think they both would want-for example, dropping the provision that the board cannot manage the business of a large publicly held corporation. To that extent, their perception is accurate.
But, basically, I do think there has been a change in perception
more than a change in tone. We have adopted, by and large, positions that are fair and that reflect good corporate policy, good social policy. I think there has been a lot of misconception. I hope
that when people see where we are going and when they understand the details of this document, there will be more acceptance
than there is now. Therefore, I hope that eventually we will be able
to get the approval of the vast group of lawyers and of the ALI. I
think they will go along with what I perceive to be fair rules based
on good policy.
The danger that you mention does exist. We have to be watchful. Obviously, the Reporters would not want to be associated with
a product that is retrogressive.
Audience Member: Professor Eisenberg, this morning you
mentioned that the law in the area of statutory mergers is rather
anachronistic. Does the American Law Institute plan to address
that area in the Restatement?
Professor Eisenberg: Yes, part III is divided into two chapters. One has to do with administrative structure. That is what I
have been talking about today-boards, committees, and so forth.
The second chapter will deal with shareholder rights and shareholder votes. There are projected sections in that chapter that will
relate to the topic of statutory mergers.
Audience Member: Professor Andrews, you seem to take the
view that the Restatement is creating a litigation model between
board and management and also among shareholders, lawyers, and
the various institutions that impact corporations. Do you believe
that the legal process is the appropriate vehicle to supervise or influence the rights of the shareholder and the corporate supervisors
in modern society?
Professor Andrews: One point I made this morning was
that, in my article, I was interested in the internal dynamics of the
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board and the possibility of the diversion of its attention from its
main business."5 I was concerned about the possibility that a decision treated as routine today might, in the future, be considered as
not having received a proper amount of deliberation. This observation is not necessarily objectively correct. It is just my prediction
as to the possibility of distraction.
Another point I made this morning was that, with respect to
evolution of society's dominant institution, the model of the caring
shareholder has become ridiculous. And speaking of anachronisms-and this whole panel subscribes to it-we keep building on
the model of owners whose rights should be protected. Yet the
number of shares that are traded on the stock exchange everyday
indicates that, when you speak of the shareholders of a company
today, you are speaking about an entirely different group tomorrow. For example, the shareholders of Bendix profited greatly
from the hostile takeover action, and Agee [William M. Agee, thenCEO of Bendix] can be defended for his takeover attempt because
the shareholders received about twenty-five dollars per share more
from his maneuver than they did from his management. Therefore,
should we forget about the fact that the shareholders of Martin
Marietta have been displaced entirely and that Allied owns a third
of a company with which it cannot do a thing and that Martin
Marietta's balance sheet is in a shambles with nine billion dollars
worth of debt? I do not know what this has to do with either defending or advocating hostile takeovers, but the old model of the
shareholder, although appropriate to the small firm, does not seem
to be appropriate to the large corporation. And one of my cautions
is that, until we find out more about the correct model of the
shareholder, let us not elaborate indefinitely on that shareholder
model, which I think is obsolete.
Dean Ruder: Professor Andrews, from my point of view as a
legal scholar, the basis of the whole web of legal, fiduciary principles that we have been talking about stems historically from the
proposition that there is an obligation owed to the corporate shareholders. I really could be enthusiastic about a project in which we
said, "Let us try to see what kind of legal principles we might come
up with if that were not the case." That would require us to develop some rules you might not like because we would have to
worry about legal rules that would provide protections for groups
other than those with which we are expressing concern-those we
25. See Andrews, supra note 14.
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now believe have the primary interest in the corporation. I do not
know where we would go with that, but we would have a real project if we had to start from scratch in forming an analysis of the
operation of the large publicly held corporations.
Professor Andrews: Thank you for returning to a third
point that I raised this morning. A generation ago, when the judgments being made in the courts about antitrust laws were deemed
to be unrealistic, the legal fraternity told itself that it should learn
more about economics and find out how competition really works
and how oligopoly functions, in order to extend the interpretation
of the Sherman Act in useful and realistic directions. That led to
the legal profession's turning to the industrial-organization field,
which is a highly theoretical branch of economics and which derives its concept of the corporation from theory rather than observation. I suggest that instead of joining forces with economics or
political science, legal scholarship should be directed to management and the law. The study of management has achieved a considerable degree of sophistication. Most of it is based on how the
corporation works as viewed from inside the corporation. That
view from inside the corporation should be useful to people viewing the corporation from the perspective of outside regulation. I
have no idea what the outcome would be. I would be surprised if a
research study of this sort, after this experience, developed new
law very quickly or made recommendations for new law. Nevertheless, this kind of study might develop new insights and new ways
of interpretation. I am not terribly concerned about whether corporation law is current; we have been getting along very nicely
with this totally obsolete idea that the board of directors manages
the corporation. No one has been paying any attention to it. It has
been in a state of benign desuetude; no one has worried about that
until the last five years.
Professor Eisenberg: I would like to address that. I must
say I heard one revolutionary statement today-and it did not
come from me. Ken Andrews said, in effect, that the board, rather
than the shareholders, owns the corporation. I never knew that you
had less of a private property interest if you bought and sold
quickly than if you bought and sold slowly. I thought that, if I
bought and sold wheat a couple of times a day, I owned it while I
had it just as much as if I had bought and stored it.
There is a speech that was given by Bevis Longstreth," who is
26. B. Longstreth, Defining the Corporate Objective and Implications for Philanthropy
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an SEC commissioner and a corporate lawyer. He analyzes the position of the Business Roundtable on this matter, which is virtually
identical with the position of Ken Andrews. Longstreth talks about
the idea of the constituency representation: employees, customers,
communities, and so forth. He notes that the position of the Business Roundtable is curiously close to that of Ralph Nader-and
you know the old bridge adage that if both sides lead the same
suit, one side is crazy. [Laughter] Then Longstreth points out:
"This ideology seems to abandon any notion of a shareholder as
owner of the corporation . . . . Once the responsibilities of management are defined to include many different constituents with
often competing claims, the notion of a fiduciary becomes difficult
to apply" 27 -and this is really David Ruder's point. Longstreth
continues-and I think rightlyOne emerges from a reading of the Business Roundtable Statement, in particular, with the idea that management owns the
corporation, with diverse and often conflicting responsibilities to
many different constituencies. This, in my judgment, is a
formula for achieving accountability to none.
... The corporation would assume quasi-governmental
powers and responsibilities, but without the Madisonian checks
and balances which have been the keystone to our democratic
systems of government .... This country does not easily accept aggregations of property and power unchecked by any form
of accountability. If corporations are successful in describing
their objectives as quasi-governmental, in the manner suggested
by the Business Roundtable and the Nader group, they will invite governmental interference in the management of their
28
affairs.
Longstreth concludes: "I view this trend, whether espoused by so
preeminent a business organization as the Business Roundtable or
by so well known a 'public citizen' as Ralph Nader as dangerous to
our free enterprise system." 29 I must say I share that view.
Professor Andrews: First of all, I had nothing to do with
that view of the Roundtable, nor was I retained or in any way involved in the Roundtable's development of its own statement
about the ALI project, despite the fact that an article of mine is
(remarks to the Financial Executives Institute North Central Area Conference, Hilton Head

Island, S.C., May 22, 1982) (available from Securities and Exchange Commission).
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. at 6-7.
29. Id. at 7.
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appended to the Roundtable refutation of the ALI report.3 The
Roundtable arranged for me to speak at the ALI 1982 annual
meeting because they suspected, in fact knew, that my views were
similar to their views, and they thought that it might serve their
cause to have a "foreigner" say something about this whole
business.
The concept of ownership is not just a matter of buying wheat
this morning and selling it this afternoon. And a corporation is not
just a piece of business property; it is a human institution. It is a
social and political institution. Therefore, the life of its most important members has to be a concern of management. The notion
of the corporation as a political institution is developing in practice
and in the concensus that surrounds the corporation in our society.
The responsibilities of ownership are being argued; we should be as
loyal to the interests of uncaring and irresponsible shareholders as
we were originally when the corporation was created. The notion
that responsibilities can be discharged to investors rather than to
the owners is not one I find difficult to address. But it should be
looked at, and one of the things that a joint project of management
and legal scholarship might discuss is the concept of ownership.
The law is very well-developed in this area; I am not qualified to
say anything more about the legal development of this concept.
But I can tell you that, in legal terms of the responsibilities of
ownership, there have been changes in the way our society looks at
the ownership of corporations. Therefore, "ownership" as a concept should be examined. Who owns Northwestern University? To
whom is it accountable? Is that a real problem? Who owns
Harvard? Nobody. The property is owned by the corporation, by
the trustees. Is there a problem about its accountability? Probably,
yes. Is it an urgent problem? No. The reason it is not an urgent
problem is that those trustees would be out of their minds if they
were not sensitive to the needs of the people who might like to
think that they are the owners of the university. The faculty, of
course, thinks it owns the university. It probably does run it often
enough. But that is not ownership-management is not ownership.
I did not ever say that it should be. But there is something to
think about here. The question to whom would management be
accountable does not automatically end a discussion, because ac30. Andrews, supra note 14, reprinted in THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT OF
THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OP
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" exhibit A
(1983).
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countability does not necessarily have to be exercised in a legal or
formal manner. Perhaps there are accountability problems with regard to the trustees of a private university. There are certainly
problems in the way that universities are run; there are ethical
problems ranging from professional football to lots of other things.
I do not know whether that is a governance problem that anyone
intends to address. I am simply saying that the concept of ownership as applied to the large publicly held corporation, which has
developed as the dominant institution of our society, needs
reexamination.
Professor Steinberg: It seems to me that the factors that
have been discussed in the last few minutes-the rights and obligations of shareholder ownership, corporate accountability, and the
apprehension that the Draft Restatement will become a political
thicket-raise a sensitive subject that the Draft Restatement has
not yet addressed. That subject is corporate-control transactions,
or to be more precise, the thorny issues relating to tender offer
contests. If the Draft Restatement is controversial now, the
problems that it will encounter in the future in defining the propriety of management's conduct in defending against a hostile tender
offer will be massive indeed. Given the Draft Restatement's present framework, it cannot consistently adopt the business judgment rule in regard to management's tactics in fending off a tender
offer. At the minimum, to maintain consistency it would seem that
the provisions that apply in the special litigation committee setting
must apply in the tender offer context as well. Nonetheless, to a
much greater extent than the special litigation committee setting,
the tender offer context will really be a battleground. That is, such
a Draft Restatement rule, were it promulgated, would have a tremendous impact upon potential target corporations, their investment bankers, and legal counsel.
There is, however, ample case law and literature saying that
the business judgment rule applies in the tender offer setting, just
like any other business decision made by management, provided
there is no self-dealing or other disabling conflicts of interest implicated. On the other hand, there exists judicial and scholarly authority for the position that "[riegardless of the tactic employed,
management can easily manufacture a 'legitimate' corporate purpose for its action, even when it employed the [defensive] tactic
solely to perpetuate its own status. '
31. Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CoR-
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A further question that may be asked in the tender offer context is what are the rights of stock ownership? After all, shareholders own these shares, and a tender offer is being made for these
shares. It may be argued that shareholders should have the right to
tender their shares, and they should not be prevented from disposing of these shares at a substantial premium by the obstructionist
tactics of target management. This is a difficult issue; there is no
question about that. I think, however, that the Draft Restatement
is going to encounter its greatest opposition when it attempts to
define the roles and duties of target management in the context of
tender offers.
Audience Member: With regard to the caring stockholders, I
am one of the babes who might get thrown out with the bath. I
have held shares of stock in companies such as IBM for thirty or
thirty-five years. I read proxy statements. I vote for and against
option plans, and there are not many stockholders who do these
things. If you listen to the radio in Miami at night, you will hear
all kinds of widows and widowers and others who have held their
stock for many years, and sometimes far too long. There has been
no discussion today about officer and director insurance. I wonder
whether you are going to address yourself to that.
Professor Eisenberg: The project will cover that issue. The
work is divided, at least initially, among several Reporters. Jack
Coffee is the Reporter for part VII, which covers remedies and
which will include a provision on insurance. I cannot speak for
Jack Coffee, but I do not envision any radical departure from existing statutes. He may, however, want to choose one statute over
another in terms of the approach.
Professor Andrews: I believe there are responsible stockholders and irresponsible stockholders. I was talking about the
stockholders who have no intention of assuming any of the obligations of ownership.
Audience Member: When I reflect on the criticisms of the
American corporation, I see it in perhaps a broader light than has
been suggested today. In many respects, the kind of debate that we
had this morning could have been about the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as
well as the Draft Restatement. Times have changed. I wonder
whether we should be drawing on that experience. For example,
Professor Eisenberg mentioned that the California corporate law,
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in its treatment of many of the difficult subjects that have been
part of the race for the bottom, had been more reflective of his
viewpoint. Is there any empirical evidence that California corporations behave differently with respect to any of the goals that we
have talked about?
Professor Eisenberg: I ought to make clear that although I
sat as a consultant on the committee that drafted the California
law, it was drafted primarily by Harold Marsh.
I do not know of any empirical evidence that California corporations are run differently. Frankly, I think the California rules are
sensible, fair rules, and that they are rules with which management
can live. My guess is that they are rules that other states eventually will adopt. But as to whether California corporations are more
or less efficient, and more or less responsive to shareholders, I do
not think there is any empirical evidence.
Audience Member: Is that not inconsistent with the position
you take in championing the views of the ALI Draft?
Professor Eisenberg: The California corporation statute
does not address the issues of composition of the board, committees, and so forth. In that respect, it is like other statutes. I ought
to add as a practical matter that our part III, which is structural,
addresses large publicly held corporations. Very few of those corporations are likely to be incorporated in California. Therefore, our
part III does not overlap with the California law.
Audience Member: There is an increasing use of financial intermediaries as a predominant vehicle for equity holding. I think I
have recently seen statistics indicating that something approaching
seventy percent of the transactions effected on the New York
Stock Exchange are by institutional traders rather than by individuals. The trend is strongly upward. That has some interesting
ramifications on some of these issues. For example, in many
tender-offer battles, it turns out that the institutions end up,
before and after, owning all of the players. In some battles, there is
up to eighty-five percent commonality of ownership among the antagonists. It seems to me that there may be an opportunity for the
development of a kind of law, extrinsic to the internal management-shareholder relationship, that might promote some of the
ends about which we have talked-the contractual relationship,
the stronger fiduciary duty of pension management to the behavior
of their portfolio. Has this received some attention?
Professor Eisenberg: It cuts two ways. On the one hand, it
cuts against the theory of shareholders being too small to have any
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significant interest. In most corporations, you have a huge number
of shareholders, and the average shareholding is very small. Nevertheless, a majority of stock is likely to be owned by sophisticated
institutions with large shareholdings who are well able to understand what is going on. And they are not turning their stock over
every day, even though they may not hold it for years. Therefore,
we have a situation in which a majority of shareholders in most
large corporations are very sophisticated, and they frequently will
hold significant positions in the corporations that prevent them
from turning over their stock too rapidly.
On the other hand, these institutional shareholders do follow
the so-called "Wall Street rule." They will vote against certain
kinds of proposals. But in terms of what might be called "active
citizenship," I do not think that they are interested. Their feeling
would be that, if a corporation needs a lot of intervention, they
would rather avoid any involvement in the corporation. I am not
faulting them for that. Nevertheless, while they are shareholders,
they have a responsibility to their own beneficiaries to read the
proxy statements and to vote. And I think they do read the statements and vote. But generally speaking they are not interested in
reforming a bad situation in a corporation.
Mr. Smith: I just have one note about the recruiting of directors. The pool of potential directors is very, very small, contrary to
what some people might believe. It is very difficult, particularly in
a large corporation, given conflicts of interest, et cetera, to find directors who are willing to undertake the responsibility and who
have the time to do it.
Professor Mofsky: We thank you very much for your presence and stand adjourned.

